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Abstract 
 
In 1993 Christopher Frayling, the Rector of the Royal College of Art in 
London, published an article about the nature of research in art and design. 
The present paper revisits his threefold distinction of "research- in art, 
research-through art and research-for art", and considers why Frayling 
found the third category to be problematic. The analytical methods used are 
linguistic (a constructionist approach to the rhetorical effect of construing 
various prepositions with "research"), and philosophical (a Wittgensteinian 
approach, distinguishing between socially agreed normative criteria, and 
non-normative indicators or symptoms). 
 
The paper argues that the instrumentality of terms such as "research" should 
be contrasted by observations of how the register of artefacts is used in the 
advancement of the field. If one adopts a constructionist approach then one 
is forced to be sceptical about the reification of publicly agreed criteria. The 
paper uses Wittgenstein's distinction between criteria and symptoms to 
identify three indicators of research that may point towards a solution to 
Frayling's problem through the re-description of his category "research-for" 
art as "a work-of" art.
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The Rhetoric of Research 
 
 
This paper approaches the debate about the nature of research in art and 
design from a linguistic point-of-view. It suggests that the way in which we 
employ language in our discussions affects the connotative meanings of the 
words. This applies not only to the meanings of terms such as "research", 
"practice" and "work" but also to their grammatical construal in phrases 
such as "research into practice", "practice-based research" and "a work of 
art". To this extent we could say that language constructs the concept of 
research rather than describing it. This would be a constructionalist 
interpretation (Hall 1997: 25). 
 
When Frayling (1993) wrote about "research- into art", "research-through 
art" and "research-for art", he appeared to be reporting on three different 
activities within research, each having a different relationship between the 
researching subject and his or her object. However, the constructionalist 
approach would say that through this normative process, the three categories 
were brought into existence. From this point onwards it became possible to 
differentiate and therefore to compare, these categories. The 
constructionalist approach also implies another, bigger problem: to what 
extent is our whole debate about research in art and design affected by 
language? In particular, to what extent do some connotations affecting our 
judgement about what constitutes research arise argumentum ex verbum 
rather than argumentum ex re.  
 
Methodologically, Frayling does not approach the problem of "research in 
art and design" as a "critical rationalist". Instead he paints us a picture, 
deriving his imagery from popular culture, especially the cinema. This is not 
an inappropriate method for establishing how many of our prejudices and 
assumptions have their roots in our use of language. Owing to the lack of an 
explicit argument about what research is, we are left to sort out the possible 
relationships between the key verbs, e.g. thinking, doing, writing, making, 
experimenting, reflecting, etc., and some value- laden adverbs, e.g. 
emotional, cognitive, etc. The symptoms, the “ex re”, of research that 
Frayling identifies are; that the outcomes of research must be explicitly 
communicable to others, that practice includes writing, design, science, etc. 
and therefore cannot be used to differentiate between these activities, and 
that it is the relationship of "research" to "practice" as shown in the 
construal of the terms "research- into [a practice]", "research-through [a 
practice]", and "research-for [a practice]" that gives the term “research” its 
meaning (Frayling 1993: 1c, 5a). 
 
It would perhaps be appropriate here to say something about the term 
"instrumental". Instruments are of various kinds but in general they serve as 
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tools with which to do something, e.g. a hammer, a barometer, etc. When 
we regard words as instruments we focus on their use and on what is 
achieved when we employ them. In this context we might regard the word 
"research" instrumentally if we attend to what is meant by a community of 
users of that word, "not with a view to discovering anything about the nature 
of the objects to which they seem to refer: rather, to find out whether there 
are such objects, and if so which objects they are" (Hunter 1990: 157). This 
seems to be Frayling's method: to consider the instrumental effect of 
cinematic representation on our perception of scientific and artistic activity. 
In these cases we can see that, far from the terms "research", "scientific" and 
"artistic" serving to focus on objective aspects of their manifestation on-
screen, they become implicated in a reciprocal act of definition and 
interpretation. For example, we call Frankenstein a scientist, not because we 
see evidence of his scientific method but because his stereotypical 
behaviour is associated with the label "scientist". Words as instruments 
therefore do something: they modify our view of the world and, the 
constructionalist would say, construct our perceptions. 
 
Since Frayling is concerned to ensure that our understand ing of the term 
"research" in the field of art and design corresponds to its use by its 
inhabitants, it is appropriate that he should look at what 
[113] 
they actually do. For example, rather than accepting or rejecting Picasso's 
assertions about his paintings qua research, Frayling considers how the 
actions of Picasso and others, e.g. Leonardo Da Vinci, Stubbs and 
Constable, might be described. If we labelled their actions as research, how 
would this affect our interpretation of these actions, and does this label need 
any qualification? Frayling's conclusion is that the term "research" can be 
employed when qualified by a prepositional triad of "into, through, for". 
 
Frayling's examples of "research- into" art and design include historical and 
theoretical perspectives (1993: 5a). His examples of "research-through" art 
and design include materials research and action research. But he finds 
"research-for" art and design problematic because its examples would have 
to include artefacts that embody the thinking but fail to make explicit their 
knowledge and understanding. The problem that arises is an instrumental 
one: is it the case that there is no content to the classification of "research-
for art and design?" If the community values Picasso's contribution, why is 
it not an example of "research-for art"? 
 
This brings us to the concrete proposal of this paper. Instrumentally the 
community needs a term that describes and labels the activity that is 
equivalent to "research-for art and design". This is because it needs to 
describe how the discipline is advanced and how knowledge arises through 
practice, and this would seem to be unavoidably linked to the embodiment 
of thinking in objects. However, the implications of the models provided by 
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the construal "research- into" and "research-through" do not transfer into a 
useful instrument of "research-for". That is not a problem concerning the 
intrinsic character of research in the field, i.e. argumentum ex re. It is a 
problem concerning the extrinsic character of how it is described, i.e. 
argumentum ex verbum. Picasso was right to say 
 
the spirit of research has poisoned those who have not fully understood all 
the positive and conclusive elements in modern art (Frayling 1993: 2a). 
 
Picasso claims that art is advanced or changed not by research, nor by 
unreflective practice, but by the creation of works which come to have 
influence. Their influential status is demonstrated by the effect they have on 
the field and not by what their creators intend or say about them. 
 
Art and design is advanced using both text and artefacts. Agrest calls these 
"registers" (Agrest in Allen, 2000: 164). Each has the capability to represent 
some aspects of a concept but not others. These concepts are critically 
analysed by rewriting and remaking, etc. Agrest claims that neither of these 
registers is comprehensive, which is why art and design uses them both. 
Practice-based research also adopts this assumption. It assumes that neither 
writing alone, nor making alone, are sufficient to represent a whole concept. 
It would be easy to act as though theory is synonymous with text and 
practice is synonymous with artefacts. Allen (2000: xvii) recognises the 
potential tension between theory and practice that comes from the 
recognition of different registers. In response he argues that each register 
has the capacity to support both theory and practice, i.e. that one can analyse 
theoretical concepts through making and practical concepts through writing. 
He prefers the distinction between primarily "hermeneutic practices", i.e. 
those concerned with "interpretation and the analysis of representations", 
and "material practices" that "transform reality by producing new objects or 
organisations of matter". Because the publicly agreed criteria of research 
include a need for the communication and dissemination of outcomes, 
research is essentially a hermeneutic practice. This will be used later to 
explain the AHRB distinction between practice and research. 
 
This distinction recognises the different merits and capabilities of the 
register of artefacts and the register of text. Text can state aims and other 
intentional activity, it can describe intangibles, abstract concepts, generals 
and universals, conditionals, negation. This is partly because text has a 
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formalised syntax in a way that there is not a formalised syntax of objects 
(Wollheim 1980: §58). A formalised grammar allows us to understand novel 
ideas. On the other hand, ideas embodied in the expressive misuse of words, 
or the abuse of the conventional use of objects, may need an accompanying 
critique to contextualise what is being done, to turn disruption into 
understanding. Joyce's Ulysses was not accepted as a great work when first 
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published. While its disruptive value may have been highly regarded from 
the outset, its contribution to knowledge was recognised when it was able to 
be placed in an historical, cultural and critical perspective. Whether one 
wishes to then say that the contribution to knowledge was implicit in the 
work, or one prefers to say the contribution was made by the critique that 
explicated it, is an example of different applications of the criteria of 
research. 
 
 
Criteria and Instrumentality 
 
This paper has claimed that Frayling's categories of "research- into", 
"research-through" and "research-for" art can be conceived as instrumental 
rather than descriptive of the problem of research in art and design. If this is 
the case, how might one proceed to discuss the concept of "research-for" art 
and design? The problem may benefit from Wittgenstein's distinction 
between criteria and symptoms. 
 
Criteria function normatively and constitute the rules for the application for 
a term. These rules are part of our form of representation. Confusions 
between criteria and symptoms arise when the form of representation is 
applicable and supportive of one grammatical proposition, but not 
supportive of another which appears to have the same structure. For 
example, first-person assertions of sensations such as "I am in pain" are 
regarded by Wittgenstein as a symptom of pain for the utterer, because of 
the lack of publicly available evidence. On the other hand, third-person 
assertions such as "she is in pain" are made on the basis of observing pain 
behaviour. Such behaviour is one of many possible criteria of her pain for 
us. Another criterion might be her avowal "I am in pain" (Biggs 1998: 9). 
 
We might use this to distinguish between criteria for research, and 
symptoms of research. Criteria would be the socially agreed definitions 
published by universities and research councils. Even if one regards them as 
unsatisfactory, gaining an award requires one to conform to the publicly 
stated criteria. They also give a means of appeal in cases of dispute. 
However, if we now want to criticise the influence of these criteria from a 
constructionalist point-of-view, then we are forced to abandon them because 
of their social instrumentality and look instead for non-socially agreed 
symptoms. 
 
One criterion of research is that it is particular type of process. This is the 
model adopted by the UK Arts and Humanities Research Board (AHRB): 
 
The Board's definition of research is primarily concerned with the definition of 
research processes, rather than outcomes. This definition is built around three key 
features and your application must fully address all of these in order to be considered 
eligible for support:  
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- it must define a series of research questions that will be addressed or problems that 
will be explored in the course of the research. It must also define its objectives in terms 
of answering those questions or reporting on the results of the research project  
 
- it must specify a research context for the questions to be addressed or problems to be 
explored. You must specify why it is important that these particular questions should 
be answered or problems explored; what other research is being or has been conducted 
in this area; and what particular contribution this particular project will make to the 
advancement of knowledge, understanding and insights in this area  
 
[115] 
 
- it must specify the research methods for addressing and answering the research 
questions. You must state how, in the course of the research project, you are going to 
set about answering the questions that have been set, or exploring the matters to be 
explored. You should also explain the rationale for your chosen research methods and 
why you think they provide the most appropriate means by which to answer the 
research questions.  
 
The AHRB definition of research provides a distinction between research and practice 
per se. Creative output can be produced, or practice undertaken, as an integral part of a 
research process as defined above; but equally, creativity or practice may involve no 
such process at all, in which case they would be ineligible for funding from the Board. 
 
The final paragraph reinforces the difference between research and some 
kinds of practice. It does so on the basis of whether or not the practice 
embodies the research process, rather than assuming that only the register of 
text has that capacity. This complements Allen's view that both the register 
of text and the register of practice have the capacity for theory and practice. 
 
Implicit in the AHRB definition are some  symptoms of research. For 
example, in order to meet the above criterion the research method must be 
applied systematically. Systematic, in this context, does not just mean 
organised and following a particular pattern or routine. Research is 
systematic in the sense that it is comprehensive. At the end of a period of 
research one is entitled to make claims because one has undertaken a 
rigorous enquiry that will have identified the current state of knowledge and 
the key players and ideas, and have provided some critical commentary or 
added to this. One can have confidence in the outcomes because an 
appropriate method will have been applied systematically resulting in an 
analysis from a coherent point-of-view. The enquiry is thus comprehensive 
from this point-of-view rather than necessarily aspiring to cover all that is 
known or could be said about a particular issue. It becomes a symptom of 
art and design research that a point-of-view or interpretational stance is 
made explicit, from whence the research can be judged as systematic and 
comprehensive. Other research on the same topic may adopt a different 
point-of-view. This is important for art and design because, contrary to the 
AHRB definition, research in this field only aspires to answer research 
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questions that arise in a particular interpretational context. It does not aspire 
to provide answers on the "objective" scientific model. 
 
A second criterion of research is an explicit method. Within the research one 
might expect to find a defence of the coherence and appropriateness of the 
method to the issue that is to be investigated. For example, a problem of 
interpretation might be researched using a comparative historical method 
based on case studies. A recent example from the University of 
Hertfordshire investigated the use of allegory in sixteenth century painting 
and compared this with its contemporary use. Two methods were 
immediately apparent. the first was to undertake a linguistic analysis of the 
term "allegory" in these two periods and to use this knowledge as a method 
for structuring an iconographic comparison. The second was the reverse: to 
undertake an iconographic analysis and use this as a method for structuring 
a linguistic comparison. The outcome of the first would be insights into 
imagery and the outcome of the second would be insights into the use of 
words and concepts.  
 
A linguistic analysis might show changes in both the meaning of allegory 
and its context as a mode of explanation, between one period and another. 
This linguistic method would be the context against which imagery could be 
evaluated, i.e. the relationship of the imagery to that which is to be 
explained. An iconographic analysis, on the other hand, would begin with 
the signifying elements of the imagery and conclude in observations about 
the use of the term. In either case, clarity about what would constitute the 
evidence to be analysed either linguistically or iconographically is essential 
for coherence. Equally authorities or counter-arguments that are relevant to 
each analysis 
[116] 
should not be transposed. One implicit symptom of the chosen method is 
therefore that it must be appropriate to the kind of outcomes that are sought, 
and the evidence used, which in turn reflects the audience that is targeted. 
 
An explicitly identified audience becomes  a third symptom of research. 
Research must identify an issue tha t is consequential for an identifiable 
group in the field. This is why an investigation into one's own practice is not 
necessarily research unless it can be shown that the outcomes are 
transferable to other cases (the "research context" in the AHRB definition 
above). This need is reinforced by the requirement for all research to have 
some form of dissemination. This dissemination, by publication or 
exhibition, etc., would be irrelevant if there were not an audience for the 
content of the research. Of course, the target audience may not know they 
are the audience, or may not know that they would benefit from the 
outcomes of the research. One might say that the audience either would or 
should read or view the research because if they did then the outcomes 
would have an influence on their practice. This obligation should not be 
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read as the moral benefit of being widely informed, but the practical benefit 
of being specifically informed about developments in one's field. The size of 
the group, especially if it can be explicitly identified, is an indicator of the 
potential impact of the research. Funding bodies seek research that will be 
significant both in terms of qualitative and quantitative impact. For 
example, the AHRB asks referees to comment on: "value for money" 
 
The peer reviewers will assess the proposal on the basis of its academic merit, taking into 
account: 
 
- the significance and importance of the project, and of the contribution it will 
make, if successful, to enhancing or developing creativity, insights, knowledge or 
understanding of the area to be studied 
 
- the appropriateness, effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed methodology, 
and the likelihood that it will produce the proposed outcome in the proposed 
timescale 
 
- the ability of the applicant(s) to bring the project to fruition, as evidenced not 
only in the application itself, but in their previous track record, taking account of 
their 'academic age' 
 
- value for money, and in particular the relationship between the funds that are 
sought and the significance and quality of the projected outcome of the research. 
 
 
With each explicit criterion there are a number of implicit symptoms. 
Criteria should present necessary and sufficient conditions but as a result 
also operate instrumentally. Symptoms are indicators that such conditions 
are being met. They are neither necessary nor sufficient, and  because of this 
tend not to operate instrumentally. Returning to the problem posed above, 
how can this distinction be used to explain why Frayling's category 
"research-for" art is problematic?  The problem for him is that examples 
would include artefacts that embody the thinking but fail to make explicit 
their knowledge and understanding. But we do have a term for such works: 
they are "works-of art".  
 
A "work-of" is characterised by becoming the object of study and cited by 
researchers. A "work-of" systematically employs a method that results in a 
novel point-of-view. It deploys it rather than commentating on it. Thus it is 
embodied or deployed in the work rather than explicated by it. The function 
of research is the opposite: to explicate rather than, or in addition to, 
embodiment; to make explicit that which is implicit. This has the effect of 
demonstrating to the examiner or the consumer of the research that the 
researcher understands what is embodied. This crosses over into the rôle of 
authorial intention since a "work-of" may embody any number of potential 
points-of-view, any or none of which may have been the intention of the 
author. However the legitimacy of claiming embodiment is not a claim of 
intention but a claim of coherence, and whether this point-of-view can 
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legitimately or coherently be explicated as being embodied or deployed in 
the "work-of". Such a claim needs to be made explicit by "research- into" the 
"work-of", and may be undertaken by the 
[117] 
author of the work. The fact that notions of habitus are said by Bourdieu to 
be embodied in Kant's Critique of Judgement does not require him to claim 
that this was Kant's intention. 
 
"Works" that have a significant impact in a field may also be grounded in 
research, e.g. Bourdieu's Distinction is a "work-of" aesthetics, but it is 
informed by thorough "research- into" the ethnography of French-Algerian 
society. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is a detailed 
argument in favour of a particular systematisation of knowledge, but it 
rarely places this argument in the context of other thinkers. The lack of 
counter-arguments may be regarded as a symptom of a "work-of" rather 
than "research- into" a particular issue, e.g. the logic of our language. 
 
The reason why Frayling's category of "research-for" is an empty set in art 
and design is because outcomes in this category are called "works-of". Such 
works advance the field and are likely to be cited as the embodiment of the 
field's knowledge. However, because they do not communicate this 
knowledge explicitly, Frayling's constructionist approach from the phrase 
"research-for" resulted in his conclusion that nothing met the publicly 
agreed criteria, rather than recognising that "works-of" exhibit appropriate 
symptoms instead. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A constructionist approach to language separates the material world from its 
symbolic representation in words. Meanings are constructed and validated at 
this symbolic level, with no necessary correspondence in the material world. 
This approach has been used to problematize the nature of research in art 
and design. Encouraged by the rhetorical approach adopted by Frayling, his 
category of "research-for" art has been recons idered by distinguishing 
between the activities that are conducted in the register of text and the 
activities that are conducted in the register of artefacts or materials. It has 
been argued, from Allen, that these registers are not synonymous with 
theory and practice respectively. Artefacts therefore have the capacity to 
advance both theory and practice, but not necessarily on their own. Frayling 
is interested in the way in which the field of art and design is advanced, 
particularly through practice and the production of artefacts. Frayling 
constructs categories but then finds it difficult to account for the lack of 
content to the category "research-for" because his constructionalist approach 
has combined two language elements: "research" and "for". The criteria for 
research, and the implication of the rôle of artefacts in the construal 
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"research-for", is found to have no counterpart in the material world, i.e. the 
world of practice. 
 
This paper has concluded that the linguistic turn that constructed the 
category "research-for" was misguided. It was led by a development of 
publicly agreed criteria rather than by underlying indicators or symptoms of 
research. This paper does not reject these publicly agreed criteria, but it does 
propose that they constructiona lly imply conclusions argumentum ex 
verbum rather than argumentum ex re, e.g. Frayling's conclusion. By 
reconsidering the indicators from the world of practice, and the need to find 
some equivalent to the category "research-for" by which the field is 
advanced, this paper argues that a better starting-point would be the phrase 
"a work-of". This phrase has the capacity to include the symptoms of 
research. It corresponds to how language is used in the field and what 
material practices are regarded as advancing it. However, it frees the 
constructionalist from the linguistic arguments that led commentators such 
as Frayling to conclude that the advancement of the field through artefacts, 
the business of "research-for art", was a problem. 
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